A Bayesian Game Based Vehicle-to-Vehicle Electricity Trading Scheme for Blockchain-Enabled Internet of Vehicles

【Author】 Xia, Shengnan; Lin, Feilong; Chen, Zhongyu; Tang, Changbing; Ma, Yongjin; Yu, Xinghuo

【Source】IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY

【影响因子】6.239

【Abstract】With ever increasing people's awareness of low carbon and environmental protection, electric vehicles are gradually gaining wide popularity. However, the driving endurance of the electric vehicle is the biggest shortage that hinders the fully acceptance of this new vehicle technology. To deal with this shortage, this paper proposed a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) electricity trading scheme based on Bayesian game pricing in blockchain-enabled Internet of vehicles (BIoV). Specifically, the Bayesian game is adopted for pricing in the distributed BIoV with incomplete information sharing. The optimal pricing under the linear strategic equilibrium has been obtained which maximizes the utilities of both sides of electricity transaction. The transaction volume is determined from the formulated convex problem that maximizes the social welfare. Then, the pricing game is implemented by the dedicated smart contract. Blockchain guarantees its trustworthiness, security, and reliability. Finally, the experimental results show that referring to the benchmark of static game with complete information, the proposed Bayesian game with incomplete information can achieve approximate satisfaction of users. The degree of approximation can reach to 98% when the pricing ranges of buyers and sellers are close. Moreover, the proposed scheme has great advantages over the static game with complete information in terms of communication overhead and timeliness in the decentralized IoVs.

【Keywords】Blockchain; Power markets; Games; Electric vehicles; Smart contracts; Pricing; Bayes methods; Blockchain; Internet of vehicles; vehicle-to-vehicle; electricity trading; Bayesian game

【发表时间】2020 JUL

【收录时间】2022-01-02

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