Incentives in Ethereum's hybrid Casper protocol

【Author】 Buterin, Vitalik; Reijsbergen, Daniel; Leonardos, Stefanos; Piliouras, Georgios

【Source】INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NETWORK MANAGEMENT

【影响因子】1.914

【Abstract】We present an overview of hybrid Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget (FFG), a proof-of-stake checkpointing protocol overlaid onto Ethereum's proof-of-work blockchain. We describe its core functionalities and reward scheme and explore its properties. Our findings indicate that Casper's implemented incentives mechanism ensures liveness, while providing safety guarantees that improve over standard proof-of-work protocols. On the basis of a minimal impact implementation of the protocol as a smart contract on the blockchain, we discuss additional issues related to parametrization, funding, throughput, and network overhead and detect potential limitations.

【Keywords】

【发表时间】2020 SEP

【收录时间】2022-01-02

【文献类型】

【主题类别】

--