Incentivizing Honest Mining in Blockchain Networks: A Reputation Approach

【Author】 Tang, Changbing; Wu, Luya; Wen, Guanghui; Zheng, Zhonglong

【Source】IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS II-EXPRESS BRIEFS

【影响因子】3.691

【Abstract】The core security of proof-of-work (PoW)-based blockchain networks, relies on PoW consensus algorithm and requires miners solving a crypto-puzzles of hash computation. However, the mining process in the blockchain is resource-intensive where only the first miner who completes full PoW will be rewarded. Therefore, miners exhibit malicious behaviors which cause a waste of distributed computation resource, even posing a threat on the efficiency of blockchain networks. In this brief, we propose a new reputation-based mechanism for the PoW computation in the blockchain, in which miners are incentivized to conduct honest mining. Based on the game theory, we design a reputation-based algorithm to encourage honest mining of miners, and thereby increase the overall revenue of the pool. In addition, numerical illustrations are also presented to support the performance of our proposed mechanism.

【Keywords】Blockchain; Bitcoin; Circuits and systems; Reliability; Consensus algorithm; Blockchain; proof-of-work; reputation-based mechanism; game theory

【发表时间】2020 JAN

【收录时间】2022-01-02

【文献类型】

【主题类别】

--