Investing in a zero-carbon future: game-theoretic strategies for clean energy and blockchain in commercial buildings

【Author】 Leng, Jie; Cheng, Yue

【Source】ENERGY AND BUILDINGS

【影响因子】7.201

【Abstract】Achieving zero-carbon building status through the integration of on-site clean energy is a critical decarbonization strategy, yet it introduces significant challenges at the intersection of technology, economics, and stakeholder alignment. The process is often hindered by high upfront costs, grid-integration risks, and information asymmetries that create a complex coordination problem between building owners and energy utilities. To dissect these strategic challenges, this study develops a differential game model analyzing the investment and operational decisions for both clean energy and blockchain adoption. Our analysis reveals that despite these hurdles, a clean energy collaboration is a Pareto-improving strategy, increasing steady-state profits for the owner by 15% and the utility by 88% over the baseline. We then quantify the severe impact of coordination frictions, showing that high grid inefficiency can cause utility profits to plummet from 0.167 to a loss of -0.0013. This provides a strong rationale for adopting blockchain, which acts as a powerful catalyst by mitigating these issues, further elevating profits by an additional 54.4% for the owner and 72.6% for the utility. The model also demonstrates that achieving zero-carbon status resolves a key market risk, transforming price volatility from a liability into a revenue opportunity. From a policy perspective, direct construction subsidies prove most effective, boosting owner and utility profits by a further 9.3% and 33.7% respectively, while technology subsidies are crucial for overcoming initial adoption barriers. Grounded in a real-world case study, this research provides a robust quantitative framework to guide the strategic decisions necessary to make zero-carbon buildings both profitable and scalable.

【Keywords】Zero-carbon buildings; Clean energy construction; Blockchain; Government subsidies; Differential game

【发表时间】2025 NOV 15

【收录时间】2025-09-11

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