Blockchain-based inventory pledge financing: an evolutionary game perspective

【Author】 Huang, Jing; Liu, Jingxian; Yang, Wensheng

【Source】KYBERNETES

【影响因子】2.352

【Abstract】PurposeInventory pledge financing (IPF) serves as an effective means to address the financial constraints faced by supply chains. This study develops an IPF system involving a bank, SMEs and a third-party logistics provider (3PL) to explore the impact of varying cost structures and regulatory environments, specifically the strategic interactions within IPF system before and after the blockchain implementation. Also, provides theoretical foundations for improving the overall efficiency of financing and advancing the application of blockchain technology.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game framework is employed to analyze the dynamics of financing behaviors before and after the blockchain implementation. Simulation methods are utilized to examine how different factors, including concealing costs, penalty structures and disposal prices, influence decision-making processes within IPF system.FindingsUnder IPF, the interactions of participants are shaped by asset management capabilities, reinvestment returns and penalties for fraud. As concealing costs increase, the likelihood of reaching a (loose regulation, compliant pledge) equilibrium rises. Post-blockchain implementation (IPFB), the equilibrium is influenced by default losses and compliance gains. Blockchain technology enhances regulation, effectively reducing fraud risks.Originality/valueThis study bridges significant gaps by offering a dynamic and behavioral perspective on IPF in the context of blockchain technology. Using an evolutionary game framework, the study uncovers how blockchain reshapes decision-making processes, mitigates fraud risks and enhances regulatory efficiency. By integrating cost structures and compliance incentives, it offers novel insights into behavioral shifts and systemic improvements in financing ecosystems.

【Keywords】Inventory pledge financing; Blockchain technology; Evolutionary game; Collusion

【发表时间】2025 2025 JAN 7

【收录时间】2025-02-16

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