Updated delegated proof of stake and Nash equilibrium: A mining pool game model for blockchain network

【Author】 Namratha, M.; Singh, Kunwar

【Source】CONCURRENCY AND COMPUTATION-PRACTICE & EXPERIENCE

【影响因子】1.831

【Abstract】In the present era, blockchain technology has an extensive variety of uses in the financial, marketing, and so forth. The performance and security of the blockchain system are directly affected by the consensus algorithm. Since there are 30 consensus techniques like proof of stake, delegated proof of stake, and proof of work, and so forth in the previous years, the operating efficiency, safety, and stability still lag behind the basic requirements. To this concern, this research manuscript introduces a novel consensus mechanism-based game model using upgraded delegated proof of stake (UDPoS) and Nash equilibrium (NE) that is UDPoS-NE. In a blockchain network powered by UDPoS, blockchain miners provide computing power to publish blocks. Due to a single miner's limited Computing Power (CP), miners frequently join mining pools and divide the pool's profits in accordance with their respective contributions. However, certain miners launch block-withholding attacks that lead to loss the computer power and endanger the blockchain network's effectiveness. Therefore, NE is used to calculate cooperative game solutions and optimize policy decisions of the miners to frustrate the block withholding attack by the influence of stakes and computing power on producing blocks. Using this mechanism, efficiency, and stability in the consensus process is achieved through the combined influence of computing resources and stakes on block generation. Finally, the suggested model's applicability and validity are confirmed with a throughput (600 TPS), delay (3 s), and energy consumption (<100 KWh) for 10 nodes and processing time (0.9 s) for 200 nodes.

【Keywords】block with holding attack; blockchain; game model; mining pool; Nash equilibrium; upgraded delegated proof of stake consensus

【发表时间】2024 2024 JUL 28

【收录时间】2024-08-14

【文献类型】实验仿真

【主题类别】

区块链治理-市场治理-挖矿分析