A Stackelberg game framework for resource management in the CloudPoS-Based blockchain network

【Author】 Tan, Chunqiao; Zhou, Li; Tsang, Y. P.; He, Chao; Yang, Huijuan

【Source】ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS

【影响因子】4.407

【Abstract】This paper proposes a two-stage Stackelberg game framework to study resource management in a CloudPoS-based blockchain network, analyzes multiple factors' impact on optimal strategies and profits of cloud service provider (CSP) and miners. The results show that the proposed model can maximize the profits of CSP and miners, the fixed reward, the total supply, and the propagation delay have a monotonic impact on miners' decisions, but a non-monotonic impact on CSP's decisions; the number of miners has a non-monotonic impact on both decisions. Our findings emphasize that the CSP should control the number of miners participating in cloud mining and the total supply of resources.

【Keywords】blockchain; cloud computing; proof-of-stake; Stackelberg game; price decision

【发表时间】2023 2023 SEP 15

【收录时间】2023-10-06

【文献类型】理论模型

【主题类别】

区块链治理-技术治理-资源管理