Blockchain-enabled enterprise bleaching green regulation banking evolution game analysis

【Author】 Xu, Lingling; Tian, Tingting

【Source】ENVIRONMENT DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY

【影响因子】4.080

【Abstract】The emergence of greenwashing and corporate defaults is harming the effectiveness of green credit implementation, leading to a gradual increase in regulatory pressure on banks. The widespread use of blockchain technology in the financial sector provides banks with regulatory transparency. Blockchain will be introduced into the evolutionary game in this paper to analyze the behavioral choices of banks and firms regarding green credit and to discuss in depth the impact of blockchain-related and internal parameters through numerical simulations. The study shows that (1) blockchain penalties are more significant disincentives to enterprise default or greenwash, while banks are more sensitive to changes in blockchain costs; (2) greenwashing can lead to excessive losses or high regulatory costs for banks, increasing the likelihood that the game system will evolve toward an ideal state (keep, on the chain); (3) there is a threshold for green credit lines that can reduce greenwashing and increase the incentive for banks to adopt blockchain regulation, while exceeding this threshold leads to greenwashing or defaults and banks opting for traditional regulation. This paper puts forward corresponding suggestions from the blockchain technology application, government, and social levels to provide reference significance for the effective realization of green credit regulation.

【Keywords】Greenwashing; Evolutionary game model; Simulation analysis; Green credit regulation; Blockchain technology

【发表时间】2023 2023 AUG 17

【收录时间】2023-09-03

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