Strategic behaviour and manipulation resistance in Peer-to-Peer, crowdsourced information gathering

【Author】 George, William

【Source】MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES

【影响因子】0.759

【Abstract】To realize the potential of crowdsourcing to tap into collective intelligence, one should consider how "crowds"are incentivized. One model, widely applied in blockchain oracles, constructs a co-ordination game where "true reporting"should be a focal point. Beyond well-known strategic behaviour associated to Keynesian Beauty Contests, we see this model provokes an additional layer of strategic behaviour. Specifically, for voting and payoff systems that satisfy minimal attack resistance assumptions, there always exist situations where participants are incentivized to provide rankings between three or more alternatives that neither reflect their honest assessment of the truth, nor correspond to their expectations of which alternatives are likely to win the vote. This result nuances our understanding of this class of Beauty Contests and mirrors issues in preference aggregation.(c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). [George, William] Kleros Cooperat, Paris, France George, W (通讯作者)，Kleros Cooperat, Paris, France. william@kleros.io "Programme d'Investissements d'Avenir" (Future Investment Program) of BPIFrance Financement [DOS0101273/00]; Kleros Cooperative "Programme d'Investissements d'Avenir" (Future Investment Program) of BPIFrance Financement(French National Research Agency (ANR)); Kleros Cooperative This research was funded by the Kleros Cooperative, a French-based Societe cooperative d'interet collectif that is developing the open-source blockchain-based dispute resolution protocol Kleros. In particular, this work was partially financed through grant #DOS0101273/00 that the Kleros Cooperative received from the "Programme d'Investissements d'Avenir" (Future Investment Program) of BPIFrance Financement. Members of the Kleros Co-operative provided useful comments in feedback on preliminary versions of this work; BPIFrance Financement did not actively participate in the research that lead to this report, the writing of this report, or the decision to publish it. 63 0 0 0 0 ELSEVIER AMSTERDAM RADARWEG 29, 1043 NX AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS 0165-4896 1879-3118 MATH SOC SCI Math. Soc. Sci. JUL 2023 124 1 23 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.04.002 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.04.002 MAY 2023 23 Economics; Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED); Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) Business & Economics; Mathematics; Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences I0KK8 hybrid 2023-06-24 WOS:000999748300001

【Keywords】Crowdsourcing; Blockchain oracle; Focal points; Vote rule; Impossibility theorem; Beauty contests

【发表时间】2023 JUL

【收录时间】2023-06-30

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