Secure Revocation Features in eKYC- Privacy Protection in Central Bank Digital Currency
【Author】 Takaragi, Kazuo; Kubota, Takashi; Wohlgemuth, Sven; Umezawa, Katsuyuki; Koyanagi, Hiroki
【Source】IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES
【影响因子】0.423
【Abstract】Central bank digital currencies require the implementation of eKYC to verify whether a trading customer is eligible online. When an organization issues an ID proof of a customer for eKYC, that proof is usually achieved in practice by a hierarchy of issuers. However, the customer wants to disclose only part of the issuer's chain and documents to the trading partner due to privacy concerns. In this research, delegatable anonymous credential (DAC) and zero-knowledge range proof (ZKRP) allow customers to arbitrarily change parts of the delegation chain and message body to range proofs expressed in inequalities. That way, customers can protect the privacy they need with their own control. Zero-knowledge proof is applied to prove the inequality between two time stamps by the time stamp server (signature presentation, public key revocation, or non-revocation) without disclosing the signature content and stamped time. It makes it possible to prove that the registration information of the national ID card is valid or invalid while keeping the user's personal information anonymous. This research aims to contribute to the realization of a sustainable financial system based on self-sovereign identity management with privacy-enhanced PKI.
【Keywords】eKYC; central bank digital currency; privacy; PKI; anonymous credential; zero-knowledge range proof
【发表时间】2023 MAR
【收录时间】2023-03-28
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