Evolutionary dynamics of sustainable blockchains

【Author】 Javarone, Marco Alberto; Di Antonio, Gabriele; Vinci, Gianni Valerio; Pietronero, Luciano; Gola, Carlo

【Source】PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY A-MATHEMATICAL PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES

【影响因子】3.213

【Abstract】The energy sustainability of blockchains, whose consensus protocol rests on the Proof-of-Work, nourishes a heated debate. The underlying issue lies in a highly energy-consuming process, defined as mining, required to validate crypto-asset transactions. Mining is the process of solving a cryptographic puzzle, incentivized by the possibility of gaining a reward. The higher the number of users performing mining, i.e. miners, the higher the overall electricity consumption of a blockchain. For that reason, mining constitutes a negative environmental externality. Here, we study whether miners' interests can meet the collective need to curb energy consumption. To this end, we introduce the Crypto-Asset Game, namely a model based on the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory devised for studying the dynamics of a population whose agents can play as crypto-asset users or as miners. The proposed model, studied via numerical simulations, reveals a rich spectrum of possible steady states. Interestingly, by setting the miners' reward in the function of the population size, agents reach a strategy profile that optimizes global energy consumption. To conclude, can a Proof-of-Work-based blockchain become energetically sustainable? Our results suggest that blockchain protocol parameters could have a relevant role in the global energy consumption of this technology.

【Keywords】Evolutionary Game Theory; Blockchain; Complex systems

【发表时间】2022 30-Nov

【收录时间】2023-01-08

【文献类型】理论模型

【主题类别】

区块链技术-核心技术-挖矿策略