Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption

【Author】 Iyengar, Garud; Saleh, Fahad; Sethuraman, Jay; Wang, Wenjun

【Source】MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

【影响因子】6.172

【Abstract】We construct an economic framework for understanding the incentives of the participants of a permissioned blockchain for supply chains and other related industries. Our study aims to determine whether adoption of blockchain is socially beneficial and whether such adoption arises in equilibrium. We find that blockchain reduces information asymmetry for consumers, thereby enhancing consumer welfare. Consumer welfare gains can be suffi-ciently large that blockchain adoption is socially beneficial; nonetheless, we find that block chain adoption does not arise in equilibrium. This situation arises because blockchain adoption costs are borne by manufacturers, and manufacturers cannot extract consumer gains through prices due to the competitive nature of the manufacturing sector. We offer a system of transfers to generate blockchain adoption in equilibrium when it is socially beneficial.

【Keywords】permissioned blockchain; blockchain adoption; technology adoption; FinTech

【发表时间】

【收录时间】2022-11-30

【文献类型】理论模型

【主题类别】

区块链治理-市场治理-技术采用