SDoS: Selfish Mining-Based Denial-of-Service Attack

【Author】 Wang, Qiuhua; Xia, Tianyu; Wang, Dong; Ren, Yizhi; Miao, Gongxun; Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond

【Source】IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY

【影响因子】7.231

【Abstract】In this paper, we focus on mining attacks targeting the Proof of Work (PoW) consensus mechanism in blockchain-based systems. Specifically, we model mining as a game and propose a mining attack - the Selfish mining-based denial of service (SDoS) attack. By studying the choices (mining or stopping) of honest miners under the attack and the adversary's revenue, we demonstrate that selfish mining is incentive-compatible with game-level denial of service attack, and that SDoS can be more threatening than existing mining attacks. Even under the worst assumption, the adversary only needs to master more than 19.6% of the total mining power to increase the revenue, and can launch a 51% attack with much less than 50%. In addition, we show that honest miners may make decisions based on the overall or current utility, and choosing the current utility is more beneficial to the adversary.

【Keywords】Blockchains; Bitcoin; Games; Costs; Denial-of-service attack; Analytical models; Proof of Work; Mining attack; blockchain; bitcoin; selfish mining; denial of service

【发表时间】2022

【收录时间】2022-10-14

【文献类型】实验仿真

【主题类别】

区块链技术-核心技术-挖矿策略