Smart contracts vs incomplete contracts: A transaction cost economics viewpoint

【Author】 Vatiero, Massimiliano

【Source】COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REVIEW

【影响因子】2.707

【Abstract】Smart contracts (i.e., agreements enforced by a blockchain) are supposed to work at lower transaction costs than traditional (and incomplete) contracts that instead exploit a costly legal enforcement. This paper challenges that claim. I argue that because of the need for adaptation to mutable and unpredictable occurrences (a chief challenge of transaction cost economics a la Oliver Williamson), smart contracts may incur higher transaction costs than traditional contracts. This paper focuses on two problems related to the adaptation: first, smart contracts are constructed to limit and potentially avoid any ex-post legal intervention, including efficiency-enhancing adaptation by courts. Second, the consensus mechanism on which every smart contract depends may lead to additional transaction costs due to a majority-driven adaptation of the blockchain that follows Mancur Olson's Logic of groups. The paper further proposes several institutional expedients that may reduce these transaction costs of smart contracts. (C) 2022 Massimiliano Vatiero. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【Keywords】Adaptation; Blockchain; Enforcement; Incomplete contracts; Smart contracts; Transaction costs

【发表时间】2022 SEP

【收录时间】2022-08-28

【文献类型】观点阐述

【主题类别】

区块链技术-核心技术-智能合约