Generous or Selfish? Weighing Transaction Forwarding Against Malicious Attacks in Payment Channel Networks

【Author】 Qin, Yi; Hu, Qin; Yu, Dong-Xiao; Cheng, Xiu-Zhen

【Source】JOURNAL OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

【影响因子】1.871

【Abstract】Scalability has long been a major challenge of cryptocurrency systems, which is mainly caused by the delay in reaching consensus when processing transactions on-chain. As an effective mitigation approach, the payment channel networks (PCNs) enable private channels among blockchain nodes to process transactions off-chain, relieving long-time waiting for the online transaction confirmation. The state-of-the-art studies of PCN focus on improving the efficiency and availability via optimizing routing, scheduling, and initial deposits, as well as preventing the system from security and privacy attacks. However, the behavioral decision dynamics of blockchain nodes under potential malicious attacks is largely neglected. To fill this gap, we employ the game theory to study the characteristics of channel interactions from both the micro and macro perspectives under the situation of channel depletion attacks. Our study is progressive, as we conduct the game-theoretic analysis of node behavioral characteristics from individuals to the whole population of PCN. Our analysis is complementary, since we utilize not only the classic game theory with the complete rationality assumption, but also the evolutionary game theory considering the limited rationality of players to portray the evolution of PCN. The results of numerous simulation experiments verify the effectiveness of our analysis.

【Keywords】blockchain; payment channel network; game theory

【发表时间】2022 JUL

【收录时间】2022-08-28

【文献类型】实验仿真

【主题类别】

区块链技术-平台项目-数字货币