Redesigning Bitcoin's Fee Market

【Author】 Lavi, Ron; Sattath, O. R.; Zohar, Aviv

【Source】ACM TRANSACTIONS ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION

【影响因子】0.000

【Abstract】The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin's challenges are (i) securing sufficient miner revenues as block rewards decrease, and (ii) alleviating the throughput limitation due to a small maximal block size cap. These issues are strongly related as increasing the maximal block size may decrease revenue due to Bitcoin's pay-your-bid approach. To decouple them, we analyze the "monopolistic auction" [16], showing (i) its revenue does not decrease as the maximal block size increases, (ii) it is resilient to an untrusted auctioneer (the miner), and (iii) simplicity for transaction issuers (bidders), as the average gain from strategic bid shading (relative to bidding one's value) diminishes as the number of bids increases.

【Keywords】Bitcoin; cryptocurrency; blockchain; auction-theory; fee-market

【发表时间】2022 MAR

【收录时间】2022-06-06

【文献类型】实证性文章

【主题类别】

区块链治理-技术治理-交易模式识别