【Author】
Andreina, Sebastien; Bohli, Jens-Matthias; Karame, Ghassan O.; Li, Wenting; Marson, Giorgia Azzurra
【Source】IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING
【Abstract】Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchain protocols emerged as a promising alternative to the largely energy-wasteful proof of work mechanisms currently in place. In contrast to computing power, however, "stake" is a virtual resource that can be replicated or reused, opening the door to attack vectors that have no counterpart in a PoW setting, and are much harder to defeat. We present PoTS (Proof of TEE-Stake), a novel PoS protocol that leverages properties of trusted execution environments (TEEs) to limit the attack surface of malicious validators, and employs techniques such as forward security to guarantee protection against posterior-corruption attacks. We show that PoTS is secure against nothing at stake, grinding, and long range attacks down to realistic hardware assumptions on TEE and well-established cryptographic assumptions, and retains reasonable security even in face of compromised TEEs. We evaluate the performance of our proposal by means of implementation. Our evaluation results demonstrate that PoTS offers an excellent trade-off between security and performance.
【Keywords】Protocols; Blockchain; Cryptography; Peer-to-peer computing; History; Hardware; Prototypes; Blockchain security; proof of stake; trusted execution environments
【标题】PoTS：无许可区块链的 TEE 股权安全证明
【摘要】权益证明 (PoS) 区块链协议成为目前存在的大量浪费能源的工作量证明机制的有希望的替代方案。然而，与计算能力相比，“权益”是一种可以复制或重复使用的虚拟资源，这为攻击向量打开了大门，在 PoW 设置中没有对应的攻击向量，而且更难被击败。我们提出了 PoTS（TEE-Stake 证明），这是一种新颖的 PoS 协议，它利用可信执行环境 (TEE) 的属性来限制恶意验证者的攻击面，并采用前向安全等技术来保证防止后向损坏攻击。我们表明，PoTS 可以抵御任何风险、磨削和远程攻击，直至对 TEE 的现实硬件假设和完善的加密假设，并且即使面对受损的 TEE，也能保持合理的安全性。我们通过实施来评估我们提案的绩效。我们的评估结果表明，PoTS 在安全性和性能之间提供了出色的平衡。
【关键词】协议；区块链；密码学；对等计算；历史;硬件;原型；区块链安全；股权证明；可信执行环境
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