【Author】
Alston, Eric; Law, Wilson; Murtazashvili, Ilia; Weiss, Martin
【Source】JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
【Abstract】Institutional economists have analyzed permissionless blockchains as a novel institutional building block for voluntary economic exchange and distributed governance, with their unique protocol features such as automated contract execution, high levels of network and process transparency, and uniquely distributed governance. But such institutional analysis needs to be complemented by polycentric analysis of how blockchains change. We characterize such change as resulting from internal sources and external sources. Internal sources include constitutional (protocol) design and collective-choice processes for updating protocols, which help coordinate network participants and users. External sources include competitive pressure from other cryptocurrency networks. By studying two leading networks, Bitcoin and Ethereum, we illustrate how conceptualizing blockchains as competing and constitutional polycentric enterprises clarifies their processes of change.
【Keywords】Bitcoin; blockchain; cryptocurrency; governance
【摘要】制度经济学家将无许可区块链分析为自愿经济交换和分布式治理的新型制度构件，其独特的协议特征如自动合同执行、高度的网络和流程透明度以及独特的分布式治理。但这样的制度分析需要辅之以对区块链如何变化的多中心分析。我们将这种变化定性为内部来源和外部来源。内部来源包括宪法（协议）设计和更新协议的集体选择过程，这有助于协调网络参与者和用户。外部来源包括来自其他加密货币网络的竞争压力。通过研究两个领先的网络比特币和以太坊，我们说明了将区块链概念化为竞争和宪法多中心企业是如何澄清其变化过程的。
【文献类型】Article; Early Access
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