【Author】
Maggiolino, Mariateresa; Zoboli, Laura
【Source】COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REVIEW
【Abstract】Antitrust law deals with economic matters as if they were all industrial processes, that is, processes through which companies transform inputs into outputs. In this sense, we could say that antitrust law is still a Nineteenth Century law, even when it comes to platforms that transform digital data into services. For this reason, when we look at blockchains through the lenses of antitrust law, they are either framed as the result of an industrial process (the blockchain as an output) or as a means that allows the development of an industrial process (the blockchain as a tool). However, these two pieces do not complete the puzzle: they do not say much about the competitive impact of blockchains. Studying the operating mechanisms of blockchains and, in particular, their governance, one realizes that the puzzle must acquire a new piece: the information on who controls the blockchain. This piece of information reveals that even dominant blockchains, which are still nowhere to be seen, could be harmless if truly devoid of any central authority and that even strategic exchanges of information via permissioned blockchains should not trigger any antitrust liability, if blockchains' administrators managed to allow the exchange only among non-competing participants. (c) 2021 Mariateresa Maggiolino and Laura Zoboli. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
【Keywords】Competition law; Blockchain; Blockchain Governance; Market power; Collusion
【摘要】反垄断法处理经济事务，就好像它们都是工业过程，即公司将投入转化为产出的过程。从这个意义上说，我们可以说反垄断法仍然是 19 世纪的法律，即使涉及将数字数据转化为服务的平台。因此，当我们从反垄断法的角度看待区块链时，它们要么被视为工业过程的结果（区块链作为输出），要么被视为允许工业过程发展的手段（区块链作为一个工具）。然而，这两部分并没有完成这个难题：它们并没有过多地说明区块链的竞争影响。研究区块链的运行机制，特别是它们的治理，人们意识到这个难题必须获得一个新的部分：关于谁控制区块链的信息。这条信息表明，即使是仍然无处可见的占主导地位的区块链，如果真正没有任何中央权威，也可能是无害的，即使通过许可区块链进行战略性信息交换也不应该引发任何反垄断责任，如果区块链的管理员管理只允许在非竞争参与者之间进行交流。 (c) 2021 Mariateresa Maggiolino 和 Laura Zoboli。由 Elsevier Ltd. 出版。保留所有权利。
【关键词】竞争法;区块链；区块链治理；市场力量;共谋
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